The latest market report for the second half of 2025 released by the Dutch Gambling Regulatory Authority contains a set of data that cannot be ignored: Young players aged 18 to 24, who make up only 9.3% of the Dutch adult population, hold 22% of all active gambling accounts. At the same time, this group contributes only 10.2% of the total legal gambling gross income, with an average monthly loss per account of 34 euros, which is less than half of the overall market average of 73 euros. At first glance, it seems that the regulators can breathe a sigh of relief—young people may gamble, but they don't spend much. However, a closer look at the data reveals a deeper concern: Despite advertising bans, social media restrictions, and deposit limits, young players are still entering gambling platforms at a rate disproportionate to their population percentage, indicating that existing protective tools may not be reaching the root of the problem. Michel Grothusen, chairman of the KSA, admits in the report that although the political world is keen on the idea of "unified gambling limits across platforms," simply increasing restrictions on legal platforms cannot prevent young people from turning to illegal channels. The core issue is not how much money young people spend, but why they continue to enter and where the existing protection framework is failing.
Behavioral Code Behind the Data: High Penetration, Low Loss, Multiple Accounts
Dissecting the data on young players in the KSA report reveals at least three layers of information. The first layer is a high penetration rate. A 9.3% population share corresponding to a 22% account share indicates that young people's willingness or frequency of gambling participation is significantly higher than other age groups. The second layer is low customer value. With an average monthly loss of 34 euros and a median of 33 euros, roughly half the overall market account average of 73 euros, it suggests that young people either gamble more cautiously or are better at using low-cost customer acquisition tools like first deposit bonuses and free bets to maneuver across multiple platforms. The third layer is a high number of accounts. The total number of active accounts in the market increased from 1.29 million in the first half of the year to 1.38 million, while the actual number of active players decreased from 540,000 to 500,000. This "account increase, headcount decrease" structural deviation is particularly evident among young players—they are more accustomed to spreading bets across platforms, both to circumvent single-account deposit limits and to chase new player benefits on different platforms.
This behavior is the result of the product logic and regulatory rules of the legal market itself. The net deposit limit system implemented in October 2024 was intended to prevent excessive betting, but objectively it has fostered cross-account arbitrage behavior. Young players, who are more proficient with digital tools, registering multiple accounts and comparing odds and promotions across different platforms is almost a no-brainer. The problem is, once they get used to maneuvering among legal platforms, illegal platforms become the next logical step once the overall attractiveness of the legal market declines due to advertising bans and product restrictions.
The Dilemma of Protection Policies: The More Restrictions, the Faster the Outflow?
Since July 2023, the Netherlands has implemented an advertising ban and social media restrictions, which have reshaped the pathways through which young players are reached in a real but not necessarily anticipated way. Nielsen data shows that the monthly average number of paid online advertisements by licensed platforms plummeted from 129,000 in the first half of the year to 75,000 in the second half, a drop of 42%. Social media activity also shrank, with Platform X almost abandoned due to age-targeting restrictions. On the surface, young people's opportunities to encounter gambling ads have significantly decreased, but KSA data shows that the number of people who did not participate in gambling but visited licensed gambling websites actually climbed from 1.8 million to 2.1 million. In other words, despite fewer ads, traffic has not decreased, and young people are still actively seeking gambling entry points.
More alarming signals come from the illegal market. KSA estimates that about 30,000 players in the second half of 2025 were dedicated to unlicensed platforms, with another 20,000 straddling legal and illegal ends. The rate of channelization to illegal channels slightly decreased from the previous value of 92% to 91%, while only 53% of overall gambling funds flowed to licensed platforms. The participation of young players in illegal platforms lacks precise statistics, but considering their price sensitivity, familiarity with digital channels, and low brand loyalty, they are precisely the ideal prey for illegal platforms. Illegal platforms do not set deposit limits, do not require identity verification, offer higher odds, and more aggressive promotions, precisely hitting the gaps left by tightened regulations in the legal market.
Grothusen points out a key contradiction in the report: While the political world is eager to discuss "unified gambling limits across platforms," if the enforcement vacuum on illegal platforms is not addressed first, any increase in restrictions on the legal market will only accelerate player outflow. For young players, when they find that protective measures on legal platforms make betting cumbersome, while illegal platforms offer unimpeded access, the scale of rational choice will tip in an obvious direction.
PASA Official Website continues to track changes in European gambling regulation and player behavior, noting that the situation of young Dutch players is not an isolated case. Data from the UK's Gamstop shows that the volume of self-exclusion registrations among 16 to 24-year-olds in the second half of 2025 surged by 40% year-on-year, indicating that the depth of participation and addiction risk among young people is not reduced by single low-loss amounts. Germany's OASIS system, in its first four years of operation, recorded nearly 350,000 registrations, also confirming the complex behavior patterns of young players under strict regulation. The problem is that self-exclusion tools and deposit limits are "post-injury" policies; they can help players who have recognized the problem to stop, but they are hard to prevent a young person who has never gambled from taking the first step.
From Blocking to Draining: Young Players Need a New Script for Protection
The core philosophy of the current Dutch regulatory framework is to reduce demand by limiting supply. The advertising ban cuts off exposure channels, deposit limits compress single-purchase power, and self-exclusion tools provide an exit mechanism. This combination might be effective for older, high-spending, low-tech-adaptive player groups, but for young players, it's more like a sieve—blocking shallow participation but not filtering out deep needs.
The real question that needs answering is: Why do young people gamble? While the KSA report does not provide data on motivations, behavior traits can be inferred—low single losses, high account numbers, and cross-platform price comparisons suggest a gameplay rather than gambling mindset. They may be chasing entertainment experiences, social currency, or even the thrill of arbitrage, rather than traditional wealth accumulation. If this assessment is correct, then simply restricting the supply of legal gambling to protect young people is like using a fishing net to stop a flood. A more effective path might be to embed protective measures into product design itself—such as mandatory risk warning pop-ups in game categories frequently used by young players, setting shorter mandatory cooldown periods, using algorithms to identify cross-account behavior and automatically consolidate limits, and building more attractive free entertainment alternatives within legal platforms.
Among the five anti-gambling projects recently funded by KSA, one focuses on embedding prevention measures into existing social and health programs, while another studies early warning signals in the workplace. However, exclusive intervention strategies for the 18 to 24 age group are still missing from the current policy toolbox. Grothusen emphasizes a "comprehensive approach"—if a defense cannot be set up at the first entry point where young players reach gambling, the subsequent remediation costs will only increase.
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This article is from "PASA-Global iGaming Leaders," a gambling industry news channel: https://t.me/pasa_news
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