The place where Wang Xing was trafficked and rescued: Miaowadi Apollo Park
After the words "Cambodia" and "telecom fraud" were tied together in 2023, "Northern Myanmar" became the second hot word in 2024. By 2025, "Miaowadi" (Mia-wadi) became the latest keyword. The blood and tears stories of the victims, the horror of the closed management of the online investment parks, the increasingly secretive and sophisticated fraud, intertwined with the gambling and drug tales of the Golden Triangle, project a mixed image of the region. Regarding fraud, public opinion generally has no tolerance, even though it is known to be mixed with various powers and complex history, there is a lack of patience to understand it in detail.
Therefore, we might as well look at this issue from another angle—telecom fraud. Although the main participants and victims are now Chinese, if the reader still remembers, Taiwanese, people from Fujian, Malaysians, Indians, Africans, etc., were once synonymous with this industry; besides telecom fraud, SMS fraud, pig-butchering scams, and virtual currency fraud have also greatly "enriched" the types and groups of fraud in recent years. The development and changes of "telecom fraud" itself are dazzling.
When there is a lack of understanding, problems are often attributed to local or group characteristics. However, is fraud something that grows out of local soil, or is it an industry that migrates and changes globally? As technology matures, is "place" still an inseparable matrix for fraud? Do we think that by attributing problems to localities we can "cleanse" our own environment? But looking back, isn't there a causal relationship between "place" and fraud?
Furthermore, how do we view the moral dilemma of fraud, or say, how do we view the framework of "clean" versus "dangerous," "civilized and orderly" versus "chaotic and disorderly," and does it match the nature of the problem? If we want to avoid viewing the impact of fraud on all regions and all people in a self-righteous manner, how should we understand it?
Why was it Northern Myanmar last year? Why is it Miaowadi on the Thai-Myanmar border this year? Like Northern Myanmar, this place also has a completely different sense of order. What kind of economic development and social order is different? Compared to other parts of Myanmar, what local characteristics do Northern Myanmar and Miaowadi have? What kind of "mindset" should we use to explore these two places, as well as other places that operate differently from our normal life rules?
Myanmar is divided into seven regions, seven states, and two union territories. The regions are predominantly Burman areas, while the states are predominantly ethnic minority areas, mainly on the borders.
In fact, "Northern Myanmar" is a concept that is quite Chinese. British colonizers launched three wars against Myanmar, first conquering the southern regions of Myanmar and then moving north to eliminate the Myanmar dynasty. During the British colonial rule over Myanmar, the territorial boundaries with neighboring countries were gradually defined, and the division into "Upper Burma" and "Lower Burma" became popular. In Myanmar society or the English-speaking world, the expressions of Upper and Lower Burma connect more emotionally with people, or give some imagination of ethnic groups, landscapes, and cultural features.
However, the term "Northern Myanmar" is related to some historical events and concepts in the Chinese-speaking world. First, it comes from the imperial era concept of "barbarians" in the system of the central dynasty, where the lands reached by the Han people were the borderlands of the central dynasty, and further down were the "barbaric" and "uncivilized ethnic groups" living in the "miasma land," with one of the places in Northern Myanmar being called "Savage Mountain" by the Han people. Secondly, it comes from the Nationalist Army's operations in "Northern Myanmar" during the Anti-Japanese War, with the popular TV series "My Regiment Commander My Regiment" broadcast in 2009 being an expanded version of this memory. Thirdly, the typical portrayal of the local armed forces in Northern Myanmar as "arming with drugs and supporting the army with drugs" by the Chinese media, and over the past decade or two, the drugs from the Golden Triangle have been seen as a major security threat, with many anti-drug campaigns conducted. Another point is the military conflicts at the Northern Myanmar border that led to shells and refugees entering Chinese territory, such as in Kachin State and Kokang. Finally, the numerous casinos on the Northern Myanmar border, especially in the southwestern region, where there have been many rumors about people being beaten, detained in water prisons, or even killed after losing money at casinos on the Northern Myanmar border more than a decade ago.
"Northern Myanmar" is remembered by society in such a way that when telecom fraud enters "Northern Myanmar" and becomes "Northern Myanmar fraud," "fraud" itself carries a violent image, and people naturally connect it with the several impressions that "Northern Myanmar" already has in the Chinese-speaking world, making people feel that this region is so chaotic and violent. Additionally, the extensive spread on social media and the "assistance" of movie creations provide people with rich imaginative resources.
The meanings of the Chinese context terms "local warlords" or "ethnic local armed forces" are very ambiguous, leading people to mistakenly believe that Myanmar or Northern Myanmar are anti-government forces that are "incompatible" with the Myanmar military and "dominate" their territories. Then, using the "national-local" framework, those regions imagined to be "full of warlords" are seen as "lawless lands" not governed by the state.
Now, several popular terms about Myanmar seen on social media, especially noticeable terms include "ethnic local armed forces" or "local warlords." Some social media posts mention, "In Northern Myanmar and Southeastern Myanmar, these fraud organizations are connected with local warlords, who provide them with shelter."
The so-called "local warlords" are actually a very vague concept. In Myanmar, in addition to the national defense army (Tatmadaw) officially organized by the state, there have been self-defense forces (Ka Kwe Ye), militia organizations (Pyithusit), and border guard forces (BGF) reorganized at different historical stages. There are also different types of anti-government armed organizations, such as ethnic armed organizations (EAOs), anti-government self-defense forces, and People's Defense Forces (PDFs).
Among them, self-defense forces were small-scale armed organizations formed by border residents with government support, which the government granted certain privileges (such as transporting opium, collecting taxes, etc.) in exchange for their cooperation in fighting against the Communist Party of Burma. Some self-defense forces joined the Communist Party of Burma and became anti-government forces; others were reorganized into the national defense army in the 1980s. Militia organizations are reserve forces established by the Myanmar government in a village or small town. After negotiations with some factions of anti-government ethnic local armed organizations at different times, the government also reorganized these small "factions" into local militias and granted them certain privileges. These small armed organizations reorganized into militias also have cases of turning back into anti-government armed forces. In addition, some ethnic armed forces that negotiated with the government were reorganized into border guard forces.
Among the anti-government armed organizations, large-scale ethnic armed organizations usually have political demands such as seeking independence, autonomy, ethnic equality, or self-governance. Some armed organizations were established during World War II, and some were gradually established after Myanmar's independence. Some reorganized militia organizations also maintain a "do not interfere with each other" balance with the government army; while the People's Defense Forces are a new anti-government armed group that emerged after the military coup in Myanmar in 2021.
The decades-long ethnic conflicts in Myanmar's border regions are closely related to the history of British colonization of Myanmar. The British colonial government adopted a "divide and rule" management approach, directly governing regions predominantly inhabited by the Burman ethnic group and indirectly governing ethnic minority regions (especially Upper Burma), somewhat similar to the Chinese strategy of "using barbarians to control barbarians," where the rulers mainly dealt with the leaders of ethnic minorities and granted them certain autonomy.
When Myanmar was forming a nation-state and trying to break away from colonial rule, it did not handle the relationship with ethnic minority regions well.
In February 1947, the transitional government of Myanmar signed the "Panglong Agreement" with the leaders of the Shan, Kachin, and Chin ethnic minorities to jointly resist the British and strive for independence. The "Panglong Agreement" agreed that ethnic minorities would jointly form a government appointed to handle frontier affairs, and the frontier regions would enjoy certain autonomy in national politics. This agreement was not well implemented by the Burmese authorities, and the promotion of Burman nationalism and (Burman-style) Buddhism by the state led various ethnic minorities to establish their own armed organizations to resist the Myanmar government and strive for political equality.
Some ethnic minorities (such as the Karen) did not participate in the "Panglong Agreement" and expressed their stance of "not conspiring with the Myanmar government" early on. Of course, there are also territorial disputes, political disagreements, disputes over the legitimacy of traditional leadership, and jurisdictional disputes based on religious beliefs among ethnic minorities and between ethnic minorities.
In recent years, the term "KK Park" has become more famous than Myawaddy County in southeastern Myanmar's Karen State—this "land of emeralds." Even KK Park and Shwe Kokko Town, where Asia Pacific City is located, are more famous than Myawaddy, which is obviously a transliteration from the Burmese language. Karen State has one of the longest histories of anti-government ethnic local armed forces in Myanmar—the Karen National Union (KNU). According to reports, the armed organization sheltering KK Park is mainly composed of former KNU forces reorganized into border guard forces after negotiating with the Myanmar government. In Tachileik, some small fraud companies simply rent residential buildings built by private owners as "parks." These local owners have more or less connections with local militias or ethnic local armed organizations, or even the Myanmar national defense army, providing shelter and economic benefits. Local owners also undertake the role of intermediaries between fraud companies and protectors.
In summary, the meanings of terms such as "local warlords" or "ethnic local armed forces" are very ambiguous, leading people to mistakenly believe that Myanmar or Northern Myanmar are anti-government forces that are "incompatible" with the Myanmar military and "dominate" their territories. Then, using the "national-local" framework, those regions imagined to be "full of warlords" are seen as "lawless lands" not governed by the state. In reality, only a small part of Northern Myanmar is governed by a certain ethnic local armed force, with independent administrative, judicial, economic, and educational systems within the region. However, more areas are under the overlapping authority of the Myanmar military/government, militias, ethnic local armed forces, and reorganized border guard forces. These forces have places of interest exchange and conflicts, gradually reaching certain balances when society operates more smoothly, and military conflicts may occur when the balance of power is disrupted.
The complex political situation in Myanmar's border regions is not because Myanmar does not govern or dares not to govern. More accurately, the complex situation we see now is the result of the Myanmar government's governance at different times, in collaboration with various forces. Clarifying this complexity helps understand why the fraud industry or other gray economies are entrenched in these regions.
When did telecom fraud officially enter Northern Myanmar?
Where is the boundary between telecom fraud and online gambling or fraudulent online gambling? Because whether it's on the Thai-Myanmar border or the China-Myanmar border, the gambling industry has a relatively long history, possibly starting in the late 1990s. Before 2017, the casinos in Kokang had already started online gambling businesses, but at that time, the term "telecom fraud" was not used. From the perspective of Northern Myanmar, the gambling industry has been around for a long time, gradually developing into an industry combining online and offline gambling. However, if considering Northern Myanmar with the term "fraud," the "fraud industry" and "fraud parks" in Northern Myanmar seem to be new terms that have emerged in recent years.
At that time, in the Myawaddy region of Karen State in southeastern Myanmar, KK Park was already making a big impact. But at that time, social media mostly talked about the fraud industry in Cambodia, and there were not so many "secondary creations" originating from KK Park. After KK Park and others were extensively exposed, some people from these parks moved north to Tachileik (on the Thai-Myanmar border in northern Myanmar), Wa State (on the China-Myanmar border, officially designated as the Second Special Region of Shan State in Myanmar), and Mong Pawk, as well as to Kokang (on the China-Myanmar border, officially designated as the First Special Region of Shan State in Myanmar) and Muse. The term "park," such as Tachileik, has become a popular term known to local ethnic groups in the past two to three years; but from mid-2017 to 2019, this term was rarely mentioned.
Take Muse as an example. The same group of buildings in Muse was described as a "casino" five or six years ago, but now local people describe it as a "park." When I asked when these parks started, they would say that these parks have been around for many years, and in fact, they were better off five or six years ago. In the past two to three years, after being cracked down by China, some parks have not been doing well, and some Chinese park investors have also moved to other places. Therefore, when people talk about "Northern Myanmar fraud," they often cannot distinguish whether they are talking about "online gambling," "fraudulent online gambling," or "internet fraud" similar to "pig-butchering scams."
In fact, Myanmar had major bases for telecom fraud more than a decade ago, with forms such as detailed chats and financial schemes, which were also brought to Cambodia by Myanmar's fraud gangs.
The inheritance relationship between telecom fraud and online gambling is worth mentioning. Originally, telecom fraud started in Taiwan, where they found people from Fujian to make fraudulent calls, such as "three blacks," impersonating public security, procuratorial, and judicial department officials to call you, claiming you were involved in a criminal case, to defraud money; or using being kidnapped or hospitalized needing medical fees as a pretext, asking your relatives and friends to pay ransom or transfer medical fees. After the people from Fujian learned how to do it, they started doing telecom fraud themselves.
So initially, telecom fraud mainly involved making calls and did not involve gambling, mostly impersonating public authorities for fraud.
How did it later connect with online gambling? It's impossible not to mention the Philippines. In 2003, the Philippine government began issuing licenses for online gambling. Some online gambling companies might be relatively regular, meaning they don't limit you, whether you lose or win money, and they let you withdraw money if you win, just transferring their offline business online.
But later, some companies started doing some tricks, such as if you won 100,000 or 1 million, they would let you withdraw money, but if you won a lot of money, such as 10 million RMB, they would start using various reasons to restrict you from withdrawing this money, such as "the system is under maintenance" or "there are many people in line now, you can choose to pay another fee to help you jump to the front of the line to withdraw money." At this point, the form of fraud extended from the online gambling platform—winning money and wanting to withdraw it, but having to deposit more money.
The rise of this form of fraud is also related to the crackdown on telecom fraud across the Taiwan Strait. At that time, some telecom fraud personnel changed their forms and locations, and coincidentally encountered the lax conditions of the Philippine online gambling industry, so some of them transformed into online gambling fraud under the guise of online gambling.
The border region of Myanmar, such as Mong La, already had many casinos, and some people from Fujian had been operating casinos there for a long time. It was reported that after the "Cross-Strait Agreement on Jointly Cracking Down on Crime and Judicial Assistance" was signed in 2009, the two sides jointly cracked down on telecom fraud, and some people fled to the Philippines, while others went to Myanmar. Therefore, traditional telecom fraud still exists in Myanmar, and they continue to impersonate public security, procuratorial, and judicial officials. The place where KK Park in Myawaddy is located is called Asia Pacific New City, which has continuously had telecom fraud companies operating inside for five or six years.
After telecom fraud evolved into fraud based on online gambling, these companies found Cambodia, which also issued gambling licenses. Therefore, from 2017, many online gambling frauds entered Cambodia.
Why is fraud tied to offline gambling? In addition to the changes in fraud methods within the industry, another reason is that many offline casinos also obtained online gambling licenses. Then they would rent out their licenses to companies that needed them, or cooperate by holding shares.
Another issue is that online gambling games can actually set winning rates in the background. Initially, they set a high winning rate to let you win, and once you increase your bets after winning money, they lower the winning rate. Coupled with the previously mentioned restrictions on withdrawing money after winning and using various reasons to make you continue to deposit money, this completely becomes a combination of offline and online fraud.
First-hand information shows that Myanmar had major bases for telecom fraud more than a decade ago, with forms such as detailed chats and financial schemes, which were also brought to Cambodia by Myanmar's fraud gangs.
Like the example just mentioned, in Muse, a place previously called a casino and now called a park, has existed for more than a decade. Whether there was a process of changing from a casino to a park, or whether it was actually doing similar things in the past and now, possibly with different people, or whether the terminology has changed, is also possible.
A bold guess is that the term "park" came from Cambodia, because after the ban on online gambling in Cambodia on August 18, 2019, many gambling operators moved to Myanmar. The fraud companies in Cambodia were all called "online investment parks," so I think the term was brought to Myanmar with the industry migration, and the closed management model was also brought to Myanmar.
If looking at the flow path of "parks," it went
